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In modern
war, and even more important, in wars that countries like ours may be
faced with, application of military power must seek to achieve maximum
effect, where ends must receive the highest priority, and where means
must remain just that: means, and not as symbols or substance of
importance in isolation to the effects and ends required. The challenge
for theory and practice is how to ensure that application of military
power of the nation is employed in such a way so as to maximise the
effects, and minimise the costs incurred in the process. This naturally
places premium on joint planning and operations.
Technology,
now reaching the levels of a Revolution in Military Affairs, complex
military organisation, and even more complex political goals in the
employment of military power in modern world, often with severe
limitations imposed by the existence of nuclear weapons, have not only
raised the premium of military power, but have required synergies
between different elements and components of military power, and between
military power and the political-diplomatic endeavours of the state to
ensure a favourable outcome if not an outright victory. It is in this
context that air power has been assuming an all-pervasive role in
maximising effects of military power. By the same logic, it constitutes
the core component of deterrence. It not only enhances the capabilities
of land and naval forces, but by itself also has an autonomous
capability to dominate hostile military power in a broad range of
scenarios and capabilities. Consequently, weakness in air power
capabilities, or in its employment, which does not maximise the effects
of military power could also become the nation's Achilles' heel.
It is not
surprising, therefore, that joint operations have become the norm rather
than the exception in modern warfare and air power the lynchpin of
military operations. Empirical evidence of all recent wars only
re-emphasise the importance of joint operations and the role that air
power performs in them. Its various dimensions and parameters keep
evolving with changes in technology, operational
environment and strategies in use. Preparing
for the future has become a critical factor in ensuring success. And
this demands continuing examination, assessment, and understanding of
the relationship between air power and other elements of military power
in successful joint operations.
This
volumes contain papers by experts in various fields to look at the
issues related to air power and joint operations, both historically as
well as in doctrinal terms, to explore various dimensions that would
help understand a dynamic subject of crucial importance to our national
defence. |
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Air Commodore
Jasjit Singh,
AVSM, VrC, VM, IAF (retd), a veteran distinguished fighter pilot and
former Director of Operations of the Indian Air Force, is Director of
the New Delhi-based Centre for Air Power Studies since 2002. He headed
India's premier think tank. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA),
New Delhi during 1987-2001. He has published extensively on strategic
and security issues including two dozen books which also include: Air
Power in Modern Warfare (1985); Non-provocative Defence (1989); Nuclear
India (1998); Kargil 1999:
Pakistan s Fourth War for Kashmir (\
999); and
India s Defence Spending
(2001).
Visiting lecturer at defence and war colleges in India and abroad.
Editorial Adviser (Defence and Strategic Affairs) to the Indian Express
Group of newspapers. Was Convenor of the Task Force to establish the
National Security Council in 1998. Member of National Security Advisory
Board (1990, 1998-2001). Former Member of International Commission for
Peace. Former Member International Commission for a New Asia. |