Volume 2  Number 3 ● Summer 2008 (Apr-June 2008)

All Files are in PDF Format - Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.0 or above required to view them. -  - Click Here to Download Adobe Acrobat Reader

INDIAN AIR FORCE IN THE DECADES AHEAD

The Chief of Staff of the Indian Air Force, Air Chief Marshal F.H. Major PVSM, AVSM, SC, VM, ADC, takes a look at the shape and role of the air force in the coming decades as the “instrument of national power.” Building and nurturing aerospace power cannot but be a national endeavour requiring the commitment of all segments of the nation; and the IAF on its part “must be able to provide the nation with the options it needs” in the future.

FORCE STRUCTURING AND DOCTRINES OF THE IAF

While civilian scholars writing on military doctrine and strategy is a common phenomenon in the West, and, in fact, is a major contribution to the development of strategic thought, this is rather uncommon in India. In a unique essay on the emerging doctrine and restructuring of the Indian Air Force from a civilian scholar, Dr. Bhashyam Kasturi has touched upon key issues that need to be seriously considered. We hope this would generate wider discussion and debate in the country which is likely to depend  ncreasingly upon aerospace power in the future, in terms of its defence as well as the pursuit of its foreign policy goals. 

STRATEGIC ROLE OF AIR POWER

This is another perspective on the evolving thinking on aerospace power, this time from Group Captain Sanjeev Bedi, a distinguished combat pilot and a practising air warrior of the Indian Air Force. He has situated his arguments for a strategic role for the IAF in the coming years to enable both the optimum exploitation of existing capabilities and building appropriate ones for the future.

Over the decades, electronic warfare has been occupying a dominant position in warfare. Some have even labelled it as the “fourth dimension” of war. Wing Commander Sanjay Poduval spells out the likely trends in this crucial area of military capability during the coming years and identifies some areas where it may again prove crucial in the outcome of war.

It is clear that Pakistan’s army rulers have been paying special attention to the modernisation of the Pakistan Air Force and Ms Shalini Chawla takes an objective and fresh approach at the highest priority accorded by the army-led regime in the renewed modernisation of the Pakistan Air Force, especially since Pakistan’s defeat in the Kargil War in the summer of 1999. She also concludes that the offensive strategy found in the past Pakistani military posture and action is likely to remain dominant. The PAF leadership has also become more vocal publicly in arguing for further build-up of the force and the need for aggressive action.

History tells us that those who ignore the lessons of history are condemned to suffer the adverse consequences of that mistake. NATO’s deployment and operations in Afghanistan since the highly successful US military campaign leading to the dramatic victory and “regime change” nearly seven years ago, and its failure so far to succeed points to the lessons of history. Shri Shelly Johny, our young scholar, summarises the labyrinth into which NATO has led itself, ignoring some fundamental factors that clearly impinge on the situation from the very beginning. With the resurgence of the Taliban, the freedom and sanctuary that Al Qaeda has come to acquire, and the negative impact on Pakistan’s own security as the major “outcomes,” it is important to consider the short-and long term implications of these operations.

Nuclear deterrence credibility over the past six decades has come to rest heavily on the concept of “second strike” capability. This itself has also included the process of building huge arsenals as part of the strategy to ensure second strike success. However, the issue of survivability, implicit in the existing nuclear strategies has rarely addressed the issue of survivability of the nuclear arsenal directly. Dr  Manpreet Sethi addresses this deficit in the context of survivability being even more critical for countries like India that rely on the doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and the strategy of “no first use.”

Major Tadd Sholtis has argued that legitimacy in public affairs about military operations in modern times is far more important than the credibility of those operations. He concludes that this requires further steps and “if air force leaders understand that communicating legitimacy is a necessary step in possessing the legitimacy required to fight and win, our leaders must take action now to better organise, train and equip PA (public affairs) forces to deliver the goods.”